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4 Executive Summary
In this study, we offer a comparative analysis of Chinese FDI growth in two developed country 
destinations: Germany and the United States. An analysis of the data establishes a sharp upward trend 
in FDI into both of these countries. The current trajectory indicates that Chinese FDI into developed 
countries like the U.S. and Germany will have a profound impact on the global economy in the future. 
As it stands, however, current levels of Chinese FDI into these countries have been quite small: 
China still holds less than 0.2 percent of the FDI stocks in both Germany and the U.S. This fact 
does not match up to the status of the three countries’ leading roles in the global economy. The 
report therefore raises key questions about the regulatory climate for Chinese FDI both within 
China – which has seen substantial liberalization as part of the government’s “going-out” strategy 
– and within Germany and the U.S.
Our findings indicate that, first, FDI controls in the United States are comparatively more restrictive 
than those in Germany – which offers tax advantages, lower labor costs, and a greater general 
openness to Chinese FDI. While China currently invests more in the U.S. than in Germany, these 
conditions could potentially reverse given the differing investment environments. This could be a 
particularly important consequence as Chinese FDI grows not only in volume but in relevance to 
both U.S. and German growth. The U.S. will therefore need to build on the work currently being 
done to make the U.S. a more attractive FDI destination for Chinese investors. 
Second, public pressure to limit or restrict Chinese FDI for political reasons – particularly acute 
in the U.S. but also present in Germany – should be resisted. For both countries, this means 
adhering to an objective, nondiscriminatory, and transparent standard for assessing the security 
implications of FDI and the use of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) – and recognizing that the vast 
majority of these transactions will benefit growth and spur job creation.
Third, better across-the-board coordination and cooperation are needed. Officials and entrepreneurs 
in all three countries need to work to promote an accurate public image of the impact of Chinese 
foreign direct investment, while U.S. and German leaders should send a strong welcoming signal 
to Chinese investors. Such cooperation involves creation of more direct platforms for interaction, 
such as an outward investment promotion agency in China, a U.S.-EU-China investment fair, and 
initiation of a regular consultation process for negotiating a trilateral investment treaty.
Finally, a key impediment to analysis continues to be a lack of uniformity in FDI data across 
countries, which seems to spring from a lack of uniform standards for how FDI is measured. 
Such uncertainty in the data may lead to suboptimal or mistaken policy prescriptions. Better 
coordination is therefore needed among the three countries to provide comparable datasets based 
on commonly agreed standards.
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China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) is on the rise. According to China’s Ministry of 
Commerce, the National Bureau of Statistics, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(2011), China’s net outward FDI flows reached US$68.81 billion in 2010, increasing by 21.7 % 
(MOFCOM et al. 2011), as compared to US$56.53 billion during the previous year. China’s net 
outward FDI has expanded almost 70 times when compared with a value of just US$1 billion in 
2000 (See Figure 1). Due to China’s outstanding economic growth, its outward FDI is due to reach 
a new high point. The Asia Society (2011) estimated that China’s FDI outflows would be between 
US$1 trillion and US$2 trillion by 2020 (Rosen and Hanemann 2011).
The “2011 World Investment Report” by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) has shown that total FDI outflows were US$1.24 trillion around the world from 2009 
to 2010 (UNCTAD 2011). According to the report, China’s outward FDI flows made up 5.1 % of that 
total in 2010. China’s outward FDI was the highest out of all developing countries and was the fifth 
largest worldwide, exceeding those of Japan and the United Kingdom. Thus, China is a middle-
income country, which is classified as any country with outward FDI of more than $50 billion.
The profound impact of these changes on the global economy is likely to expand as Chinese FDI 
increases, as the current trajectory suggests. Many have studied the evolving patterns of Chinese 
FDI into developing countries, and it is not until recently that Chinese FDI in the developed world 
started to draw more attention. In this paper, we give an analysis of the evolution of Chinese FDI 
in recent years, reasons and policy basis, look at the available FDI data sources, and then focus 
on the experience of Chinese FDI in two of its major developed country destinations, the U.S. and 
Germany. We compare the role Chinese FDI has played in these two economies and the way it has 
been received. Based on the comparison, we draw some reflection points that contribute to a fuller 
picture of the performance, future trends, and needs of Chinese FDI in developed markets. 
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Characteristics and Trends of Chinese Outward FDI
First, the rapid growth of China’s outward FDI has been stable and resilient. China was able to 
maintain a rapidly growing economy even with the effects of the 2009 global economic crisis. 
Chinese enterprises’ cooperation around international investment in 2009 helped contribute to 
China’s outward FDI flows reaching US$56.53 billion. In 2010, its outward FDI net flows reached 
a record level of US$68.81 billion. The country’s outward FDI has averaged an annual growth rate 
of 49.9 % from 2002–2010 (MOFCOM et al. 2011).
Second, China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been the main driver of FDI. Although 
the share of large investments by SOEs appears to have dropped noticeably in recently years, 
state entities still dominate outward investment by volume. China’s FDI outflows by SOEs 
have accounted for more than two-thirds of total Chinese FDI, and still continue to rise. Private 
Chinese companies’ capabilities for outward FDI are relatively low due to their limited access to 
funding, technology, and market influence. According to data released by the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) in 2011, SOEs accounted for the largest share of China’s FDI stock at 66.2 % 
(decreasing by 3 % from the previous year), with limited liability companies following at 23.6 % 
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Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment
Figure 1: China's outward FDI flows 1990–2010 (in Billions of Dollars)
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Figure 2: Breakdown of Chinese FDI by Types of Investors
Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Direct Investment
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(increasing 1.6 % over the previous year), and shareholding companies at 6.1 %. The rest of the 
total is composed of cooperative shares corporations at 1.1 %, private companies at 1.5 %, foreign 
companies at 0.7 %, collective enterprises at 0.2 %, Hong Kong-Macao-Taiwan invested enterprises 
at 0.1 %, and others at 0.5 % (See Figure 2). Out of the total FDI contributed by Chinese SOEs, 77 % 
of that was made by national SOEs, while 20.3 % was made by the local SOEs (an increase of 3.2 % 
over the previous year).
Third, cross-border mergers and acquisition activity (M&A) by Chinese enterprises has been 
drastically growing. Although greenfield investment is the main FDI method used by Chinese 
firms, the number of those firms engaged in outward cross-border M&A activities is on the rise 
during recent years. Cross-border M&A investment accounted for 34 % of China’s outward FDI 
in 2009, and just 18 % in 2003. In 2010, FDI made by Chinese enterprises through mergers 
and acquisitions accounted for 43.2 % of the total (See Figure 3). The future cross-border M&A 
investments of Chinese companies will continue to rise, because those companies are increasingly 
willing to invest abroad, driven by the need to access new resources and technology, to acquire 
global brands and to diversify operations internationally. According to the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), Geely Group, a Chinese car manufacturer, successfully completed 
the acquisition of Volvo Car Corporation from Ford Motor Company for more than US$2.5 billion. 
One year after Geely Group bought the Swedish brand, Volvo had achieved profitability with car 
sales up 15 % or more. Employee satisfaction was at the highest level in a decade (84 %) and 1,500 
more employees were hired (Zhang 2011).
Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2003, 2010
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Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment
Figure 4: 2010 Outflows of Chinese FDI by Industries 
(in Billions of Dollars)
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Figure 5a: Chinese Outward FDI Stock by Region
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Figure 5b: Chinese Outward FDI Flows to Europe and North America, 
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Fourth, composition of China’s outward FDI has gradually diversified. Because of the increasing 
number of motivations for Chinese companies’ global expansion, the country’s foreign investment 
began covering most sectors of the national economy. Out of China’s total FDI flow, 90 % went 
into leasing and commercial services, mining, finance, wholesale and retail, manufacturing, 
transportation, warehousing, and postal services. Financial sectors experienced the most rapid 
growth in FDI (See Figure 4).
Fifth, the regional distribution of China’s FDI has been concentrated in Asia and Latin America, 
but the quantity going to Europe and North America has increased rapidly in recent years. At the 
end of 2010, concentration of China’s forward FDI stock in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe, 
Oceania, and North America has been 72 %, 14 %, 4 %, 5 %, 3 %, and 2 %, respectively (See Figure 
5a). Because of relative political stability, fewer risks of changes in policy and law, well-developed 
consumer markets, as well as other factors, Chinese FDI has found growing traction in Europe 
and North America. In 2010, China’s FDI flows into these two regions were significant at US$9.54 
billion, almost double the US$4.9 billion invested in 2009 and more than quadruple the level in 
2004 (US$2.2 billion). In 2010, Chinese FDI into Europe and North America accounted for nearly 
14 % of total Chinese FDI flows compared with just over 2 % two years earlier (See Figure 5b). 
Chinese FDI to the European Union (EU) alone accounted for nearly 10 % of total Chinese ODI flows 
– experiencing the fastest growth in the EU area in 2010. 
Reasons Behind the Increasing Chinese FDI
The motivation behind China’s rapid growth in FDI has been a subject of much speculation 
and concern throughout the world. The most likely explanation, however, is simply grounded in 
China’s domestic and international environment, its present stage of economic development, and 
its economic status in the world. China’s FDI strategy is geared toward a myriad of goals: access 
to natural resources; reduction of the costs of production; access to new technologies, patents, 
trademarks, and skilled labor; access to new business markets abroad; reduction of its currency 
reserves; diversification of assets and optimization of the return on investment; and a greater 
capacity to provide for the aging Chinese population.
In executing its FDI strategy, China has encountered a favorable domestic and international 
environment, owing to three contributing factors. The first has been the current global trend 
towards peace. Although regional turbulence remains an ongoing concern worldwide, no major 
war has significantly disrupted the favorable conditions for development of China’s FDI. A second 
contributing factor has been the global financial crisis. Many countries addressed the problem 
of soaring asset prices caused by the crisis by loosening foreign investment restrictions, thereby 
facilitating a great deal of Chinese FDI. In addition, China’s foreign exchange reserves grew from 
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US$165.57 billion at the end of 2000 to nearly US$3.2 trillion in June 2011 (SAFE 2011). This 
growth created both the favorable conditions and the necessity for China’s FDI portfolio to become 
more diversified in assets. Currently most of China’s tremendous currency reserves are invested 
in government bonds, especially those issued by the U.S. government. Moreover, China started to 
buy bonds from deeply indebted members of the Euro area. Acquiring foreign companies is a way 
to diversify the entire portfolio and to optimize the return on investment (Söhn 2010, 525). A third 
factor contributing domestically has been the country’s adoption of its “going-out” policy, which 
not only has allowed Chinese enterprises to accumulate investment experience, but has also laid 
the groundwork for the Chinese government to gradually relax its approval process for outward 
FDI projects.
The unbalanced development of Chinese enterprises was the main reason that Chinese SOEs 
dominated FDI. After more than three decades of economic reform and liberalization, Chinese 
enterprises have strengthened their competitiveness in both domestic and international markets. 
Through additional ongoing reforms, Chinese SOEs have upgraded their competitiveness and 
overall quality. A number of large, internationally competitive companies and enterprise groups 
are currently being formed. In 2002, only 11 SOEs held total assets of more than a hundred billion 
dollars, while in 2009 that number reached 53. By 2009, thirty Chinese SOEs were selected as 
finalists for Global Fortune 500 companies (SASAC 2009). The strength of SOEs greatly enhanced 
their multinational operations and global expansion capability. Currently, Chinese state-owned and 
state holding enterprises have diversified their business interests in order to increase the value 
of assets, to cope with pressure to expand their business into international markets, and to deal 
with fierce competition. Conversely, China’s private enterprises, especially small- and medium-
sized private enterprises (SMEs), suffer from a widespread lack of core technology, innovative 
ability, and management talent. Moreover, because the domestic market can meet the profit needs 
of Chinese SMEs’ development, these companies lack strong motivations for investing outward.
The reason for China’s increased cross-border M&A activity is that Chinese enterprises have gained a 
competitive advantage by optimizing their industry structure. Chinese outward FDI is still dominated 
by greenfield investment, but the proportion of cross-border M&A has been on the rise, mainly due 
to a strong demand for Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMT) and for extending the value 
chain. According to research by Yao and Li (2011), China’s manufacturing sector has been involved 
extensively in cross-border production networks. However, China’s manufacturing and export 
enterprises depend, to a large extent, on Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) production and 
the development of trade intermediaries such as Hong Kong, instead of controlling the external 
markets network and service distribution channels themselves (Yao and Li 2011). Chinese enterprises 
are highly dependent on external markets, but are unable to establish strong international sales, 
due to the increasing risk of foreign investment and production expansion. With the growth and 
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development of Chinese export enterprises, these companies have increasingly requested control 
over the risks and benefits of further investment. Thus they are gradually asking for their own 
external markets network and service distribution channels. Cross-border M&A provides a fast way 
to accomplish this and enables Chinese enterprises, in combination with other companies, domestic 
or international, to optimize their industry structure and gain competitive advantage.
In order to maintain the stability of a world energy supply system, Chinese enterprises needed to 
expand their overseas energy investments. The world’s mineral resources are rich but unevenly 
distributed. No single country can rely completely on its own energy resources to meet all of 
its production processing needs. China’s economy has rapidly become involved in regional and 
global production networks. The country has become a “world factory”, producing a variety of 
products for global consumption. Meanwhile, in regional and international production networks, 
Chinese enterprises are more engaged in making products with resource intensive, highly 
polluting manufacturing techniques that are low value-added and low in capital and technology 
requirements. China’s own natural resources are not enough to satisfy its huge energy resource 
demand as a “world factory”, so it needs to use global energy resources to maintain the stability of 
the global supply chain. Only a few enterprises have ever been able to exert some control over the 
supply and pricing of global resources. There has also been an increasing tendency to politicize 
the international energy issue. With the rapid development of international capital markets and 
the virtual economy, financial derivatives targeted at energy resources increased dramatically. 
Because of increasing speculation, the price of energy resources has not adhered to the laws 
of supply and demand and has grown increasingly volatile. In order to reduce the fluctuation 
and uncertainty of international energy prices, Chinese enterprises leverage FDI to create joint 
ventures, make acquisitions, or purchase shares of companies involved in overseas energy and 
resource exploration, development, and production. In this way, Chinese enterprises increasingly 
seek to engage in FDI.
The geographical distribution of China’s FDI is influenced by countries that need its investment 
the most. According to the British scholar Rao’s research (Zhou 2009), enterprises of developing 
countries tend to channel their investments in the following order: countries and regions at the 
same level of economic development, neighboring countries, other developing countries, and 
finally developed countries. Chinese FDI has mostly targeted developing countries because Chinese 
enterprises are not yet equipped to compete effectively with developed countries’ enterprises, 
because Chinese enterprises so far have primarily relied on low labor costs and cheap pricing 
advantages. In addition, Chinese FDI targets developing countries because these countries are 
usually rich in energy resources that are crucial to China’s economic development and they also 
need China’s capital to develop their own economy. However, with China’s massive investments in 
developing countries in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, risks have increasingly come to light. 
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Meanwhile, resource-intensive development models have put an enormous environmental burden 
on Chinese society. As the Chinese population ages and income levels increase, the advantage of 
cheap labor – which its impressive economic development has relied on – is diminishing quickly. 
China’s economic policies have gradually shifted to encourage industries to move up the global 
value chain. Investing in the developed market helps Chinese companies access the technological 
and managerial know how, the high-reputation goods and technologies, and the large purchasing 
power of customers in the host countries. For example, German technology and brands have a 
high reputation in China and FDI is one main instrument to import these technologies to China 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2009, p. 9). Moreover, Germany possesses a 
large volume of skilled labor. Investing in Germany enables China to profit from this labor force. In 
addition, German consumers have higher purchasing power. China could use its FDI in Germany 
to capture new shares of German markets. For all the above-mentioned reasons, Chinese FDI is 
shifting more and more towards developed countries such as the U.S. and Europe (see Figure 5b).
The Evolution of Chinese FDI Policy1
China’s foreign investment policy has evolved from a focus on attracting foreign capital toward a 
more balanced approach that equally stresses inward and outward foreign direct investment. The 
main reason behind this change is the Chinese government’s gradual relaxation of the controls 
for foreign investment.
The “two-gap” model, introduced by Harvard professor Hollis B. Chenery in the 1960s, can, to 
a certain extent, explain China’s investment policy adjustments (Chenery 1969, 446–9). When 
China was just opening up to the world in the 1980’s, its main problem was a shortage of capital, 
including a shortage of domestic savings and foreign exchange. These two gaps could be narrowed 
by attracting foreign investment. Government control of overseas investment was seen as more 
effective at preventing the widening of the two gaps. In the late 1990s, as China’s economy 
developed and its foreign exchange reserves jumped, the “two gap” pattern gradually changed into 
the “two surplus” pattern: a surplus of both domestic savings and foreign exchange reserves. The 
Chinese government again adjusted its economic policy according to economic growth patterns. 
Starting in 2000, China entered its current stage of FDI development. Even though there was no 
systematic strategy for China’s FDI, the Chinese government began to gradually relax controls 
on FDI. Liberalization of FDI was embodied by three aspects: enacting China’s initial “going-out” 
strategy, relaxing strict approval procedures and management systems around FDI, and enacting 
policies to encourage FDI. 
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•	 The	“Going-Out”	Strategy
The Chinese government had long ago begun incorporating the importance of foreign direct 
investment into its strategic business plan. As early as 1992, the Chinese government proposed 
to actively expand Chinese enterprises’ foreign investment and multinational operations. In 1997, 
during the fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party, the Chinese government put forward its 
policy to encourage Chinese enterprises with comparative advantages to participate in foreign 
investment. The 1998 government report, “Report on the Work of the Government”, recommended 
that China invest overseas cautiously. In 1999 and 2000, the same publication, “Report on the Work 
of the Government”, proposed to encourage “eligible enterprises” and “Chinese enterprises with 
comparative advantages to invest overseas and develop a global manufacturing industry.” These 
recommendations, however, were only the prototype. In October 2000, the “going-out” strategy 
was promoted to a national strategy that encouraged capable Chinese firms in more industries to 
engage in five main activities: (1) to expand their international finance abilities and technological 
cooperation; (2) to continue the development of projects that promote the export of domestic 
technologies, products, equipment, and labor; (3) to explore for international resources to mitigate 
the domestic shortage of natural resources; (4) to create overseas research and development (R&D) 
centers to utilize advanced international technologies, managerial skills, and professionals; (5) 
and to enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and accelerate their entry 
into foreign markets. 
In March 2011, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan stated that it would continue combining its policies to 
encourage FDI and attract foreign investment, placing equal emphasis on the need to attract foreign 
capital and to invest overseas and the need to better use domestic and international markets and 
resources safely and efficiently. The Plan did not mention clear support and promotion systems for 
Chinese FDI. It stressed that the Chinese government would guide different types of enterprises to 
invest overseas with a primary emphasis on autonomous, market-oriented decision-making. This 
emphasis ensured that Chinese enterprises would have more freedom over their international 
investment strategies. The Chinese government’s guide on Chinese enterprises investing overseas 
can be summarized in four points: (1) deepen international cooperation around energy resource 
development and manufacturing; (2) support overseas technical R&D cooperation, encourage 
manufacturing enterprises to invest overseas effectively, and create an international marketing 
network and a world famous brand; (3) expand international cooperation in agriculture, develop 
foreign project-contracting and labor services cooperation, and help to improve the livelihoods 
of local people; (4) gradually enhance the growth of large Chinese multinational companies and 
financial institutions and their capabilities in international business.
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•	 	Evolution	of	the	Chinese	Government’s	Approval	Procedures	and	
Management System of FDI
Major obstacles for Chinese FDI included China’s strict foreign exchange management system 
and cumbersome, lengthy approval procedures, which severely limited the growth of Chinese 
FDI. As the Chinese government adjusted its foreign direct investment policy, FDI’s improved 
approval and management system helped the promotion of Chinese FDI. The milestone policy 
issued by China’s State Council in 2004 was the “Decision on Reform of Investment Structure”. 
This document clearly stipulated that the Chinese government will implement a registration and 
approval system instead of an inspection system. In August 2008, China enacted the “Regulations 
of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration”, which stipulated that the 
foreign exchange settlement process change from mandatory settlement of all foreign exchange in 
Renminbi (RMB) to a voluntary settlement process. 
The Chinese government’s approval and registration regulations have been simplified and 
improved, mainly in the following three aspects: 
First, a substantial increase in the amount of Chinese enterprises’ overseas investment has been 
observed. Before 2004, Chinese outbound investment projects valued at more than US$1 million had 
to be approved by the State Council or relevant ministries. After 2004, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) approved Chinese FDI on resources projects valued between US$30 
million and US$200 million and Chinese FDI on non-resources projects valued between US$10 
million and US$50 million. The State Council approved Chinese FDI on resources projects valued 
over US$200 million and FDI on non-resources projects valued over US $50 million. For resource 
projects valued under US$30 million and non-resource projects valued under US$10 million, Chinese 
SOEs only needed to register with NDRC instead of getting approval from the Chinese government. 
Since February 2011, NDRC has relaxed limitations on foreign investment in mineral resources 
valued from US$30 million to US$300 million. “The Administrative Measures Concerning Outbound 
Investment” promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in March 2009 said that China’s 
overseas investments valued under US$100 million do not need to get an approval from the MOC, 
and local enterprises investing abroad in projects valued between US$10 million and US$100 million 
only need to obtain approval from their provincial commerce departments. 
Second, the Chinese government shortened the approval time for FDI. The new regulations 
prescribed that the approval and review process of foreign investments should be accelerated to 
about 20 to 30 working days. For non-energy outbound investments valued under US$10 million, 
the MOC and the provincial commerce departments shortened the approval and review time to 
three working days from the previous range of 15 to 20 days.
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Third, use of foreign exchange was liberalized. On July 13, 2009, the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) promulgated the act, “Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration of Outbound 
Direct Investment by Domestic Institutions.” According to the Foreign Exchange Regulations act, 
domestic Chinese companies and institutions may make outbound direct investments by utilizing 
five different sources: foreign exchange owned by the Chinese investor, domestic foreign exchange 
loans conforming to relevant Chinese laws and regulations, foreign exchange purchased using the 
investor’s own Renminbi (RMB), intangible assets, and profits from outbound direct investments 
that the investor has retained overseas. At the same time, SAFE examinations of outbound direct 
investments were no longer required. However, relevant parties had to submit a “Certificate of 
Outbound Investment.” The new regulations streamlined the approval process for Chinese 
companies and institutions that wanted to make investments overseas. 
•	 	The	Evolution	of	the	Chinese	Government’s	Services	and	Policies	 
encouraging Outbound Investment
The Chinese foreign investment service system has been gradually improving. Regarding a 
comprehensive and effective service system for FDI, the 10th Five-Year Plan briefly mentioned that 
the Chinese government should create conditions for the implementation of a “going global” strategy 
in finance, insurance, foreign exchange, taxation, human resources, legal, information services, 
immigration, and the like. A 2004 report entitled “Report on the Work of the Government” emphasized 
the Chinese government’s services to strengthen the coordination and guidance of outbound 
investment. Since 2005, the Chinese government’s service system has been divided into two roles: 
providing supports on (1) credit, insurance, and foreign exchange and (2) coordination and guidance. 
The 11th Five-Year Plan stressed improving the promotion and protection system for investment 
overseas. In addition to continued emphasis on coordination, the 11th Five-Year Plan also proposed 
to enhance the risk management. The 12th Five-Year Plan proposed plans to strengthen research on 
investment climate and to protect overseas interests. These were two aspects that were added to the 
government services system on top of previous proposals of coordination and risk management.
Since 2000, the Chinese government has set up four special government funds to promote Chinese 
enterprises’ foreign investment. These include the Market Developing Fund of Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises (2000), the Special Fund for Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation (2005), 
the Special Fund for Risk Exploration of Mineral Resources (2005), and the Special Fund for Textile 
Industry (2006). The size of each of these funds, however, was small. The China Development Bank 
(CDB) has helped launch four funds since 1998: the Sino-Swiss Cooperation Fund (1998), the 
ASEAN China Investment Fund (2003), the China-Belgium Direct Equity Investment Fund (2004), 
and the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund)(2007). Funding volume for the first three 
funds was small and funding commitment to the CADFund was only US$5 billion.
18 Counting the Stock of Chinese FDI in Germany and the U.S.
Impressive Growth in Recent Years
The data sources for Chinese FDI in the U.S. are not gathered consistently. We have consulted 
multiple sources of data, including the Chinese Statistical Bulletin, the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, and some researchers’ own bottom-up data collections. However, by any type of measure, 
it is clear that despite uncertainty around absolute amounts, Chinese FDI in the U.S. is experiencing 
particularly fast growth in recent years. The official Chinese account of annual flow of Chinese 
FDI to the U.S. was US$65 million in 2003, and this number jumped to US$909 million in 2009. 
Some other data sources have shown figures that are more than double the official one in 2009; 
the Rhodium Group, for example, shows a US$5.2 billion FDI flow in 2010 (See Figure 6). The U.S. 
has been among the top destinations for the last decade. From 2003 to 2007, the U.S. was ranked 
as the number four recipient of Chinese FDI stock, just behind Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, 
and the British Virgin Islands (the latter two are more likely tax havens than investment targets). 
From 2007 onward, the Chinese FDI stock has at least tripled, with stock count over US$11 billion 
in 2010 according to one calculation (See Figure 6). 
Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2003-2010; Bureau of Economic Analysis Database; 
China Investment Monitor Database.
Figure 6: Chinese FDI stock to the U.S. in billions of dollars – Comparison 
among the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (China), Bureau of Economic Analysis (the United States), and China 
Investment Monitor Database (The Rhodium Group)
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There is a similar picture of Chinese FDI in Germany and the European Union in general. From 
1993 to 2003, China’s FDI stock in Germany stayed more or less constant. But from 2003 to 2010, 
this stock roughly quintupled from 156 million Euros to 775 million Euros (See Figure 7). From 
1998 to 2010, China’s FDI stock in the European Union grew tremendously from 368 million Euros 
to 6.728 billion Euros, especially in the years after 2005 (See Figure 7). From 2005 to 2010, the 
value of China’s FDI within the European Union grew by more than 450 %.
However, despite the fast growth of Chinese FDI to the U.S., Germany, and the European Union, it 
is important to point out that these flows still play negligible roles in the respective economies. As 
the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment, U.S. FDI stock reached US$2.58 trillion in 2010 
(CIA fact book). It is true that the growth rate of Chinese FDI’s share in the U.S. has been impressive: 
growing five-fold from 2003 to 2010 (See Figure 8). But still, Chinese FDI to the U.S. constitutes a very 
small fraction of what the U.S. attracts in total. Some have estimated that much of Chinese FDI has used 
Hong Kong as a launching platform (Invest HK), thus there should be much more Chinese FDI to the 
Source Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistik “Zeitreihen“ (download: 30 April 2012). Note: FDI according to the German Central Bank (“Bundesbank“) 
include new investments by foreign investors as well as foreign mergers and acquisitions and foreign credits or loans. Source EU: Eurostat, Data on 
“Balance of payment statistics“, (download: 15 March 2012).
Figure 7: China’s FDI Stock in Germany and in EU-27 (Data are for EU-15 until 
2000, for EU-25 2001–2003 and for EU-27 as from 2004), in Millions of Euros
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Figure 8: Chinese FDI as Percentage of Total FDI in the United States 
(Position/Stock on Historical Cost Basis)
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Figure 9: Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States by 
Country, On Historical Cost Basis, 2010
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
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U.S. than reported via Hong Kong as well. However, even when including Hong Kong FDI to the U.S., at 
the highest point, the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong FDI holds less than half a percentage point of 
U.S. inward FDI total. This is a clear contrast when compared to traditional industrial powers in Europe, 
including some much smaller economies, and Japan (See Figure 9). 
The significance of Chinese FDI in Germany and in Europe is also growing rapidly while remaining 
very limited still (See Figure 10): From 1989 to 2004, Chinese FDI accounted for about 0.05 % of 
the FDI stock in Germany. After that, data show a growing share of Chinese FDI in Germany. By 
2010, China held 0.15 % of the 522.5 billion Euros FDI stocks in Germany (see Table 2). This growth 
rate of its share in Germany has been impressive, but it still lags far behind Germany’s main 
investors such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the U.S. The same applies to the European 
Union where China owns only 0.23 % of the 2.964 trillion Euros of foreign FDI stocks in 2010 (See 
Figure 10). Meanwhile, FDI from Hong Kong plays an even more marginal role in Germany than 
in the U.S. In fact, Hong Kong’s investment activities in Germany are even smaller than those of 
mainland China (See Figure 11). Looking at the European Union, things are a little bit different. 
Hong Kong’s FDI into Europe is much larger than Chinese FDI (See Figure 12). Nevertheless, even 
if China’s and Hong Kong’s FDI in Europe are combined, their share in all Extra-EU-FDI stocks is 
still small and somewhere around 1 % and at most 1.6 %. (see Table 8 in the appendix).
Source Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistik “Zeitreihen“ (download: 30 April 2012), own calculations. Note: FDI according to the German Central Bank 
(“Bundesbank“) include new investments by foreign investors as well as foreign mergers and acquisitions and foreign credits or loans. Source EU: Eurostat, 
Data on “Balance of payment statistics“, (download: 15 March 2012), own calculations.
Figure 10: Share of China’s FDI Stock in Germany and in the European 
Union (Data are for EU-15 until 2000, for EU-25 2001–2003 and for EU-27 
as from 2004), Percent
EUGermany
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
2010200920082007200620052004200320022001200019991998
22 Counting the Stock of Chinese FDI in Germany and the U.S.
•	 Changing	Features	of	Chinese	FDI	to	the	U.S.	and	Germany
There are some differences in how sectorial investment and business activities are categorized in 
the U.S. and in Germany with regard to Chinese FDI. In addition, the data of the German Central 
Bank, which include both greenfield investment and M&A, only include 44 Chinese companies 
in Germany in 2010. This number is too small for the German Central Bank to separate the FDI 
figures by sectors and business activities. However, we do have sectorial and business activities 
based on greenfield projects recorded by the Germany Trade and Invest Agency. Moreover, the 
most recent Chinese Ministry of Commerce data on FDI show some trends of Chinese FDI in 
Europe in general. The MOFCOM does not separate by country in the data, but does attribute 
certain weight to Germany in its analysis. Combining the available data, some common themes 
emerge for comparing Chinese FDI in the two economies. 
Traditionally, Chinese companies’ investment in both the U.S. and Germany more often takes 
the form of sales offices and servicing branches for the product supplied. Almost 60 % of China’s 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistik “Zeitreihen“ (download: 30 April 2012). Note: FDI according to the German Central Bank (“Bundesbank“)
include new investments by foreign investors as well as foreign mergers and acquisitions and foreign credits or loans.
Figure 11: China’s and Hong Kong’s FDI Stock in Germany (primary (“unmittel- 
bare”) and secondary (“mittelbare”) FDI, consolidated, Millions of Euros)
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greenfield FDI stock in Germany applies to sales, marketing, and support. If we combine Chinese 
FDI stock sales, leasing, and commercial services in the U.S., it comprises about 35 % of total 
Chinese FDI stock by the end of 2010 (MOFCOM et al. 2010). 
Manufacturing is a key sectorial target for Chinese FDI in both the U.S. and Germany. In 2010 
and 2009, manufacturing took 25.4 % and 41 % of the total Chinese FDI to the U.S. (the share of 
manufacturing in Chinese FDI stock is 27 % in 2010)(MOFCOM et al. 2010). Manufacturing’s share 
of total Chinese greenfield FDI is shown as 9 % in 2009, which may not represent the whole picture 
because much manufacturing investment by China is in the form of acquiring local manufacturers. 
In the Chinese government data, manufacturing takes 24.6 % of the total FDI stock to the EU, and 
in 2010, the share in FDI flow was 33.9 %. Germany is also listed as one of the main destinations 
of manufacturing-based Chinese FDI. 
Chinese FDI in both the U.S. and Germany has focused heavily in sectors such as industrial 
machinery; auto and transport; and information and communication technology. There were 
Source: Eurostat, Data on “Balance of payment statistics”, (download: 15 March 2012).
Figure 12: EU Direct Investment Inward Stocks by Extra EU Investing Countries: 
China’s and Hong Kong’s FDI Stock (Data are for EU-15 until 2000, for EU-25 
2001–2003 and for EU-27 as from 2004, Millions of Euros)
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2 interview with German Trade and Invest Agency
changes in the number of deals annually accomplished in the U.S. for each of the sectors, so the 
investment values vary. But these sectors no doubt have played a major role in attracting Chinese 
FDI to the U.S. in recent years. Particularly large was industrial machinery investment flow, 
which was $US1.642 billion in 2009 and $US1.028 billion in 2010 (China Investment Monitor, 
2011). With regard to Germany, 30 % of Chinese outbound greenfield investment is related to 
automotive, industrial machinery, and equipment. The second-largest sector is the electronic and 
semi-conductor sector (16 %), followed by information and communication technologies including 
software (13 %, see figure 13). 
Since the U.S. is also a resource rich country, one luxury that the German market does not offer 
to Chinese investors is fossil fuels and chemicals. There have been several large-scale investment 
projects proposed from China to the U.S. related to fossil fuels, steel, and chemical industries in 
recent years. Particularly in 2010, investment in these industries has taken the largest share of 
Chinese FDI to the U.S. (See Figure 14) On the other hand, Germany is becoming an attractive 
destination for renewable energy-related investment from China. Though the share in this area is 
still low at 2 %, industry insiders have witnessed the rapidly growing presence of Chinese investors 
in this industry recently.2 One street in Munich where many Chinese renewable energy sector 
investors set up offices is being called the “Solar Street”.
Meanwhile, much of Chinese FDI to the U.S. in recent years also went to financial services, which 
comprised 46.1 % of total FDI flow in 2008, 15.5 % in 2009, and 9.6 % in 2010. The share of Chinese 
FDI stock in the financial sector in Europe was 11.6 % in 2010, but the share of the flow in 2010 
was only 5.4 %. Germany’s significance in financial sector FDI from China ranks after the U.K., 
Luxemburg, and France in 2010. 
Chinese FDI in the automotive industry
China is on the way to replicating the Japanese dominance of the automotive world 
markets. Although China’s exports of automobiles are still small, China breaks into global 
automotive markets via less developed countries. China’s most important target markets 
are Algeria, Iran, Vietnam, Syria, and Egypt. In order to compete in the automotive world 
markets, China has bought know-how. Some well-known acquisitions of international 
automobile manufacturers are Rover, Saab, and Volvo. In addition, China has acquired 
component suppliers. The largest automotive component supplier, the Wanxiang Group 
with more than 40,000 employees, owns shares of at least ten U.S. automotive component 
suppliers, which produce amongst others axles, driving shafts, wheel hubs, and steering 
systems. As far as is known, there has been just one Chinese acquisition of a German 
automotive component supplier: in 2007 the Fuyao Glass Industry Group bought Fürmotec 
GmbH from Heilbronn (for more details see Söhn 2010).
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Figure 13a: Chinese Projects in Germany by Sector (2003–2009)
Source: fDi Markets, Oct. 2010
Note: FDI projects refer to greenfield and expansion investment projects. M&A projects are not included.
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Figure 13b: Chinese Projects in Germany by Business Activity (2003–2009)
Source: fDi Markets, Oct. 2010
Note: FDI projects refer to greenfield and expansion investment projects. M&A projects are not included.
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A final important note is that Chinese private investors in the U.S. have conducted many more 
deals than state owned enterprises. For example, China Investment Monitor tracked 40 private 
investor deals in 2009 and 45 in 2010. The respective number of government-backed deals was 14 
in 2009 and 18 in 2010. However, the scale of the deals was much larger by government investors 
than by private investors. In 2010, government backed deals averaged $US262 million, contrasting 
to a $US15 million average for private investors’ deals. 
Greenfield vs. M&A
The format of Chinese FDI in the U.S. is also becoming increasingly diversified and sophisticated. 
Traditionally, Chinese companies have focused more on greenfield investment, but mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) – which can help a company gain faster access to local technology and market 
– are starting to play a much larger role in Chinese FDI. M&A increased from US$60 million in 
Source: China Investment Monitor Database, the Rhodium Group.   http://www.rhgroup.net/china-investment-monitor/
Figure 14: Chinese Direct Investment in the US by Industry 
(in Millions of Dollars)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Others Information Technology Industrial Machinery Fossil Fuels & Chemicals
Consumer Products Clean Energy Aero, Auto & TransportFinance & Business Services
27Counting the Stock of Chinese FDI in Germany and the U.S.
Source: China Investment Monitor Database, the Rhodium Group   http://www.rhgroup.net/china-investment-monitor/
Figure 15: Greenfield and MA
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1999 to US$30.2 billion in 2008, accounting for 54 % of total Chinese FDI in that year. In the U.S., 
Chinese FDI in both greenfield and M&A has increased remarkably in value in recent years (See 
Figure 15). By the third quarter of 2011, there had been 147 greenfield projects with $US3.26 
billion total capital expenditures announced from China. The growth in the amount put in M&A 
is particularly noticeable: in 2003, M&A deals in the U.S. were valued at $US132 million, and this 
number grew to $US4.9 billion in 2010. On average, the value of Chinese M&A deals in the U.S. 
are usually much larger than greenfield deals (See Figure 16). 
There is a lack of data to separate Chinese FDI in Germany into greenfield and M&A. However, 
looking at preliminary data for the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, it seems that a change 
also has taken place with respect to China’s FDI strategy toward Europe. From October 2010 to 
March 2011, Chinese firms and banks expended $US64 billion for greenfield projects, mergers, 
and acquisitions, and trade and cooperation agreements in Europe. Although these figures 
incorporate more activities than pure FDI, the increase is remarkable because these $US64 
billion represent “more than half of the total investment and trade facilitation flows in Europe 
since early 2008” (Godement and Parello-Plesner 2011, 4). Godement and Parello-Plesner thus 
make the following case: “Admittedly, these figures include soft loans and deals that have been 
signed but not yet implemented, and therefore may be overestimated. Yet even the size of mergers 
and acquisitions suggests that, along with the U.S., Europe is suddenly overtaking Asia and the 
developing world – the first two targets of China’s “going-out” strategy – as the top destinations 
for Chinese investment.”
Figure 16: The Average Value per Deal (in Millions of Dollars)
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Source: China Investment Monitor Database, the Rhodium Group     http://www.rhgroup.net/china-investment-monitor
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Impact of Chinese FDI: Jobs and Value Added
When examining the impact of Chinese FDI in Germany and the U.S., it is important to refer to 
the negligible role mentioned before of Chinese FDI in the German and U.S. economies. Just as 
the stock of Chinese FDI is experiencing rapid growth in Germany and the U.S. with a small share 
in the respective markets, the impact of Chinese FDI on German and U.S. economies is growing 
rapidly, with negligible significance as of yet. 
With respect to Germany, China also plays a minor but increasingly important role. The same 
holds true with respect to the number of companies owned by foreign investors, the number of 
employees who work in these companies, and the volume of sales of these companies. According 
to statistics of the German Central Bank, in 2010 about 14,000 companies in Germany were owned 
by foreign investors. China held just 44 companies (See Table 1 in the appendix). All employees 
of these 14,000 companies totaled about 2.5 million. Only about 3,000 personnel were employed 
by the 44 Chinese companies (see Table 2 in the appendix). The volume of sales of all foreign 
companies in Germany equaled almost 1.26 trillion Euros in 2010, Chinese companies totaling 1.5 
billion Euros (see Table 3 in the appendix).
Figure 17: Jobs created by Chinese and Japanese FDI. Chinese left axis, 
Japanese right axis 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis     http://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal.htm
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Source: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis for recorded employment     http://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal.htm
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Figure 18: Comparison of the Recorded Employment and Estimate 
(Thousands of Employees)
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Figure 19:  Value Added (Gross Product; in Millions of Dollars)
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Since small and medium companies play an essential role in Germany, the statistics of the German 
Central Bank underestimate the number of foreign companies and their employees in Germany. 
Thus we add the data of another source that includes companies with a balance sheet total of 
less than 3 million Euros. According to this definition there are about 700 companies owned 
by Chinese investors with 6,600 employees (see table 1). Other experts even think that there 
are about 1,000 Chinese companies in Germany – not counting Chinese restaurants and travel 
agencies (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2009,11). Nevertheless, even when 
using a broader definition of FDI, the number of new jobs created by Chinese FDI projects is still 
pretty small. Since 2003, the largest number of new jobs created by one single FDI project was 100 
(see Table 4 in the appendix).
Meanwhile, the impact of Chinese FDI on American jobs and the added-value in the U.S. economy 
follow similar trends. The U.S. state trade office estimates about 10 new American jobs are created 
directly or indirectly by every $US500,000 in Chinese investment. In this calculation, the number 
of jobs created by Chinese FDI would be slightly more than the BEA report of job creation (See 
Figure 18). When using this measure to compare the possible jobs created so far, one can clearly 
see the upward trend, just as the total amount of FDI from China is increasing. But still the absolute 
number is a fraction of what the other larger FDI partners have been creating (See Figure 17) and 
compares to the 5.2 million total jobs generated by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms in 2009 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce Data). The same applies to the value-added of Chinese FDI to the U.S.: it 
enjoys about 10 % average annual growth, but the overall contribution to the U.S. economy is still 
negligible (See Figure 19). 
Table 1: Foreign Companies and Employees in Germany in 2010
Country Number of Companies (Approx. Value) Number of Employees (Approx. Value)
Netherlands  8000  476000
USA  6200  741000
UK  5200  303000
France  3700  328000
Sweden  1300  151000
Spain  1100  71000
Japan  980  95000
Russia  950  4600
China  700  6600
Canada  390  18700
Poland  370  4700
India  280  13000
Czech Rep.  250  2100
South Korea  125  4700
Source: Germany Trade & Invest, Germany’s Major Investment Partners – China, Berlin/Bonn 2011, p. 12.
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3 The act specifies eight issues, including reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment; freeing the 
transfer of funds relating to investments; reducing or eliminating performance requirements, forced technology transfers, and 
other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of investments; establishing standards for expropriation and 
compensation for expropriation; establishing standards for fair and equitable treatment; providing meaningful procedures for 
resolving investment disputes; improving mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor and a government; and 
ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism.
Understanding U.S. and German FDI Policy Toward China
As mentioned before, China’s growing FDI toward the U.S. fits as part of its “going-out” strategic 
goal. Also, the outward push is generated by its internal economic situation. However, the U.S. as 
a prime FDI destination for China is not a coincidence. The U.S. has a wide-open and attractive 
business environment in general. It was ranked No. 1 in the Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Attractiveness Index (Germany No. 10), No. 2 in the At Kearney FDI Confidence Index (Germany 
No. 5), No. 4 in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Rankings for Innovation 
(Germany No. 5) and No. 5 in the World Bank 2010 Ease of Doing Business Report (Germany No. 
22). For companies looking for local consumption expansion, the U.S. has the strongest consumer 
market in the world; for those looking for technological innovation, the U.S. houses 34 % of global 
R&D and 50 % of developed world researchers. (OECD)
This is the basic frame of reference for FDI’s entrance to the U.S. market. However, in the post 
9/11 years, there has been an ongoing adjustment to ensure national security while maintaining 
market openness in the U.S. This has led to a set of policy incentives to attract further FDI, as well 
as new provisions to ensure national defense capabilities.
In the Trade Act of 2002, the U.S. government tried to clarify its FDI policy through a list of 
objectives that are intended to direct the U.S. trade negotiators to reduce or eliminate artificial or 
trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment. The Act specified eight ways to reduce barriers of 
investment, clarify policy standards, and improve dispute resolutions (Jackson 2010).3
In 2007, the Bush administration began a new Invest in America initiative led by the International 
Trade Administration. In June 2011, it was incorporated into President Obama’s SelectUSA initiative. 
This is currently the primary U.S. government mechanism to promote foreign investment by 
facilitating business inquiries and providing policy guidelines to investors. The Invest in America 
program acts as the ombudsman, among the U.S. Departments of State, Agriculture, Homeland 
Security, and the Environmental Protection Agency. It also develops tailor-made events to promote 
certain states as FDI destinations. For example, the program publishes guidelines on federal 
investment incentives and programs, including the Clean-Energy Manufacturing Tax Incentives 
from which the Chinese Yingli Green Energy Company is receiving $US4.5 million in credits. 
It also held an investment promotion event in Louisiana and facilitated meetings with Chinese 
companies that the state identified as important investors (Invest America). 
Germany’s major intentions associated with inbound FDI are the creation of jobs, positive effects on 
German FDI abroad and German exports, financial facilities, and – due to demographic change in 
Germany – finding successors capable of leading companies. Because Germany itself is an export-
oriented economy, staying open for foreign investors is important in its request for reciprocity. 
If Germany starts to constrain investments from abroad – and especially from certain countries 
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such as China – it is most likely that those countries would react with restrictions on imports 
from Germany. Restrictions on FDI thus would cause protectionism, and for an export-oriented 
economy, protectionism causes high costs (see Dohse 2011). Hence, partly to better access foreign 
sales markets, Germany has retained a very open attitude towards Chinese FDI. Meanwhile, even 
though there is no general credit crunch in Germany, it is getting more difficult to finance certain 
investments, particularly during the current debt crisis in Europe. Thus financially strong partners 
such as China are particularly welcome in recent years.
In order to support foreign investors and thus increase their FDI in Germany, the German 
government created a special organization called “Germany Trade and Invest.” This organization 
is the economic development agency of the Federal Republic of Germany. It promotes Germany as 
a business and technology location and informs foreign investors about investment opportunities 
in Germany. Germany Trade and Invest supports international companies from market entry to 
business start-up in Germany with the aim to increase the number of jobs in Germany. In doing 
so, the organization operates according to the principle of equal treatment: No matter how large 
the potential investor or this investment is, which industrial branch is affected, and from which 
country the potential investor comes, every investor is treated in the same way. The German FDI 
policy is entirely nondiscriminatory with respect to every aspect of an investment in Germany 
from a foreign investor. In particular, FDI policy in Germany has no reservation against FDI from 
special countries. This becomes especially apparent when looking at the German laws concerning 
FDI in Germany.
Although there are no tax privileges or subsidies for FDI in Germany, the “New Laender” in 
eastern Germany offers various options in order to promote economic development (investment 
assistance, tax relief, infrastructure improvements, financial assistance and more). All these offers 
are available for any investor, German or foreign, and Chinese investors have been taking great 
advantage. In July 2011, the Chinese company Greatview Aseptic Packaging (GA Pack, formerly 
known as Tralin Pak) started to build a manufacturing plant in Halle (Saxony-Anhalt). The volume 
of investment adds up to 50 million Euros. Through the end of 2013, 110 new jobs will be created. 
Amongst others, government aid of Saxony-Anhalt was one main reason for this investment (Expo 
Real 2011). The relevance of this investment becomes apparent by comparing its volume with the 
entire Chinese FDI stock in Germany (See Table 2): In 2010, this stock had a value of 775 million 
Euros. Hence this FDI accounts for about 6.5 % of China’s FDI stock in Germany.
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Case Study: Dürkopp Adler AG (Germany, Bielefeld) 
Dürkopp Adler AG is a medium-sized company in East Westphalia that has been producing 
sewing machines since 1860. On 30 June 2005, the Chinese SGSB GROUP CO. LTD took 
over the majority of shares. Before that the workforce had been dwindling for decades. The 
number of employees at the Bielefeld plant had fallen from about 2,500 to approximately 
450. Chinese investors bought this company with the long-term goal of gaining significant 
share in the European market and the world market for sewing machines. They expected 
to obtain more esteem with this well-known German brand and thus increase the volume 
of sales. In addition, the SGSB GROUP had little international experience and thus hoped 
to profit from the international management of Dürkopp Adler AG. The common fear of 
workers that they would lose their jobs wasn’t realized. Not a single production machine 
was dismantled from the plant in Bielefeld. Within three years the number of employees 
grew from 450 to 555 (for more details see Sohm, Linke and Klossek 2009, p. 16 to 19 and 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2009, p. 12). Thus this investment is 
beneficial for both sides: Chinese investors and the German workforce.
Table 2: Foreign FDI Stocks in Germany (primary (“unmittelbare”) and 
secondary (“mittelbare”) FDI, consolidated)
Regions/Countries of origin FDI Stocks in millions of Euros (in 2010)
Europe   440 019
          Netherlands    121 925
          Luxembourg    77 206
          United Kingdom    44 931
          France    44 523
North America   51 270
          United States    49 096
          Canada    2 174
Central America   3 607
South America   283
Asia   24 015
          Japan    14 541
          Korea    4 060
          Iran    1 337
          United Arab Emirates    1 023
          China    775
Rest of the World   3 335
Sum   522 529
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2012, p. 48–54. Note: FDI according to the German Central Bank (“Bundesbank”) include 
new investments by foreign investors as well as foreign mergers and acquisitions and foreign credits or loans.
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Regulations and Concerns in the U.S. and Germany
On the other side, there also has been strengthening of national security measures on investment 
policies. One of the most widely reported, sometimes controversial regulatory bodies on foreign 
investment is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The root of CFIUS 
can be traced back to the Defense Production Act of 1950. The Exon-Florio amendment, which is 
section 721 of the Defense Production Act, was adopted in 1988 amid concerns over Japanese 
investment. The provision granted the president authority to prohibit proposed or pending foreign 
M&A or takeovers inside the U.S. that might threaten national security. The act did not specify 
what kind of presidential action is appropriate and it gave a broad definition of national security. 
After the September 11th attacks, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001). This act provided a certain degree of clarity regarding the industries that are considered 
critical infrastructure for national security: telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, 
transportation sector, and certain cyber and physical infrastructure services (Jackson 2010, 6). 
Congressional oversight of foreign investment reached a new level of intensity in 2006 when 
lawmakers blocked Dubai Ports World’s acquisition of Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 
a British firm that ran important port operations in the U.S. through a U.S. subsidiary. The vote to 
block the deal came under national security concerns, after CFIUS had already approved the deal 
and the president threatened to veto the congressional action. In light of this controversy at the end 
of 2006, the Bush administration, through arrangement for the acquisition of Lucent Technology 
by the French company Alcatel SA, made a significant change that allows CFIUS to reopen a 
review of a deal and to overturn its approval at any time should it believe the companies failed to 
comply with some specific national security arrangements. In 2007, the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) was adopted, which provided greater clarity on the CFIUS 
process and additional factors related to national security reviews and strengthened congressional 
oversight of FDI (Fagan 2008, 10) This act also changed the presumption of the harmless nature of 
foreign investment by requiring CFIUS to investigate all foreign investment transactions in which 
the foreign person is owned or controlled by a foreign government, regardless of the nature of the 
business (Jackson 2010, 11).
China had a taste of CFIUS as early as 1990, when the acquisition of Mamco Manufacturing (a 
Seattle-based aircraft parts manufacturer) by China National Aero Tech was blocked by President 
Bush after CFIUS cited significant national security risks. Encounters with CFIUS increased in 
the past decade. In 2005, China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) offered a cash bid 
of $US18.5 billion to buy shares of Unocal Corp., an American oil company. CNOOC voluntarily 
subjected the deal to CFIUS review, which became extremely complicated by fierce political 
resistance from the U.S. Congress over national security concerns. CNOOC eventually withdrew 
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the bid, which was more than $US1 billion higher than the eventual deal winner Chevron. 
Following this, the Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei failed to convince CFIUS that its 
bid to purchase network gear-maker 3Com in 2009 or its purchase of server technology company 
3Leaf in 2011 were of no threat to U.S. national security. The list of such encounters continues, 
and mostly involves proposed Chinese takeover of U.S. companies that are in the energy and 
resources, banking, or high-tech sectors (Rosen and Hanemann 2011) These experiences have led 
many in China to believe that Chinese investors are been treated unfairly and that Chinese M&A 
transactions are among the most likely to receive the greatest scrutiny (Fagan 2008, 9).
While the media has mostly concentrated on controversial Chinese FDI to the U.S. involving 
CFIUS, it is important to point out that CFIUS only investigates and regulates foreign investors 
that take control or purchase significant shares of existing U.S. businesses, and it does not have 
jurisdiction over greenfield investment. In addition, CFIUS is not the only hurdle for FDI related to 
national security concerns. For example, the National Industrial Security Program was established 
in 1993 to safeguard industrial information held by contractors, licensees, and grantees of the 
U.S. government that are critical to national security. In 2006, the Strategic Materials Protection 
Board, composed of representatives from several offices in the Department of Defense, was created 
to examine materials critical to national security and recommend strategy for the president to 
ensure domestic availability of these materials. Their recommendation could prevent foreign 
investment in business tied to critical material such as specific types of steel (Jackson 2010, 
8) In additional, export-control regulations can have significant impact on a foreign company’s 
acquisition investment in certain industries in the U.S. For example, the Export Administration 
Regulations under the Commerce Department determine “dual–use” items, many of which are not 
accessible for China; the International Traffic in Arms Regulations under the State Department 
controls export or foreign transfer of U.S. Munitions List articles and services, which are currently 
prohibited by law to be exported or re-exported to China; and the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
under the Treasury Department manages sanctions programs, which make it illegal for any 
foreign nationals in the U.S. or U.S. citizens abroad to facilitate trade or financial transactions 
with a sanctioned country. These regulations further complicate Chinese investment in the U.S., 
because China itself is subject to many export-controlled businesses, and many of those countries 
on the sanction list are the ones Chinese companies frequently trade with, such as Burma, Cuba, 
and Iran. So when Chinese businesses attempt to acquire U.S. companies or make greenfield 
investments in sensitive industries related to the aforementioned regulations, they are likely to 
come under extra scrutiny by U.S. authorities. 
Several key concerns have been voiced in the U.S. against Chinese investment projects. First, if the 
Chinese company is owned by the communist government or the company personnel are related 
to the Chinese military, accessing certain U.S. high-tech industries (such as the aerospace sector) 
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4 This concern has been raised by multiple high-level Chinese officials, including the commerce minister and vice-finance minister 
during the S&E Dialogue in May 2011
will facilitate buildups of the defense sector, which might be a main adversary of the U.S. Second, 
the company may have incentives to infiltrate the U.S. government or defense system for sabotage, 
in sectors such as telecommunication. A third concern is whether the company might try to control 
access to key resources critical to U.S. national security, such as oil. A final criticism is that China 
receives exceptionally cheap credit, which gives it unfair competitive advantage in the U.S. market. 
Similar concerns apply when the company is privately owned, maybe to a lesser degree, but it 
might still be seen as a hostile foreign predator trying to take over a famous U.S. brand. Of all these 
concerns, some are more grounded in reality than others. 
Many U.S. experts recognize the potentially enormous future benefit from growing Chinese FDI 
to the country’s economy. Some blame U.S. political interference in the FDI screening process as 
attempts to protect special interests from economic competition or to pursue a “Fortress America” 
vision of national security, and they believe a more open and political influence-free environment 
needs to be created to encourage Chinese FDI (Rosen and Hanemann 2011). Others see the growing 
Chinese FDI as a necessary and beneficial step for the U.S. to be able to demand reciprocity of 
openness from China for U.S. FDI (Graham and Marchick 2006, 130) Meanwhile, extensive media 
coverage of problems encountered by some Chinese companies investing in the U.S. has led many 
in China to believe that Chinese investment is not particularly welcomed. The controversy has 
been so hyped that it became one of the key discussion points during top-level bilateral meetings. 
During the U.S.-China Security and Economic Dialogue in 2011, Chinese official made a point of 
asking the U.S. to welcome Chinese investment and in particular, to treat the SOEs equally.4 
One popular fear associated with FDI is the threat that a company takeover by a foreign investor 
has negative consequences for production and employment at the absorbed company. As a matter 
of fact, empirical studies show that this fear is ill-founded, on the whole. Studies in Germany 
illustrate that takeovers by a foreign investor have no noteworthy impact – neither positive 
nor negative. The same holds true for other industrial countries (see Görg 2011). For example, 
according to the European Investment Monitor of Ernst & Young, in 2010 FDI projects created 
more than 12,000 jobs in Germany (Ernst & Young 2011, p. 16). Thus Germany should not be afraid 
of Chinese FDI. The same holds true for Europe. According to the European Investment Monitor, 
FDI projects created more than 137,000 jobs in Europe (Ernst & Young 2011, p. 16). In a paper on 
the European international investment policy, the European Commission states: “Conversely, the 
overall benefits of inward FDI into the EU are well-established, notably in relation to the role of 
foreign investment in creating jobs, optimizing resource allocation, transferring technology and 
skills, increasing competition, and boosting trade. This explains why our Member States, like 
other nations around the world, make significant efforts to attract foreign investment” (European 
Commission 2010, p. 3).
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Nevertheless, in 2007 there was an intense debate in Germany on the question of whether Germany 
needs safeguards against Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). This debate was raised by China’s 
announcement to carry over parts of Chinese currency reserves to a Sovereign Wealth Fund. In its 
Annual Economic Report 2007/2008, the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat 
zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) wrote one chapter dealing with this topic, 
coming to the conclusion that it is not necessary to tighten the laws concerning investment controls 
in Germany. Some months later the Commission of the European Communities published a report on 
the same topic, titled “A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds.” The report came to 
a similar conclusion. Its core message is: “Various suggestions have emerged in the public debate as 
possible avenues to step up the European response to SWFs. These have included an EU committee 
on foreign investments to mirror arrangements in the U.S., an EU-wide screening mechanism or 
some “golden shares” mechanism for non-EU foreign investment. All these suggestions run the 
risk of sending a misleading signal – that the EU is stepping back from its commitment to an open 
investment regime. They would also be difficult to reconcile with EU law and international obligations. 
Instead, the Commission considers that the right approach is to promote a cooperative effort between 
recipient countries and SWFs and their sponsor countries to establish a set of principles ensuring 
the transparency, predictability, and accountability of SWFs investments. “The EU and the Member 
States already have specific instruments that enable them to formulate appropriate responses to 
risks or challenges raised by cross-border investments, including investments by SWFs, for reasons 
of public policy and public security” (Commission of the European Communities 2008, p. 7–8). In 
summary, neither Germany nor the entire European Union thinks that it is necessary to intensify FDI 
controls with respect to the investment activities of Sovereign Wealth Funds.
Laws concerning the handling of inward FDI in Germany result from three main legal frameworks: 
the European Treaty, the German Law on Foreign Trade and Payments, and so-called “Bilateral 
Investment Treaties” (BITs) (see Hirdina and Jost 2010, p. 4).
Being a member of the European Union, Germany takes an important framework from the 
European treaties for its FDI policy. As mentioned above, the European Commission is convinced 
that inward FDI is favorable for Europe in terms of job creation, productivity gains, and sustainable 
economic growth and thus altogether have a positive effect on welfare in Europe. Therefore the 
main objective of the European Commission connected with inward FDI is to facilitate stable 
employment and stable growth (see European Commission n. d. and European Parliament 2011, p. 
5). The main European legal foundations in this context are Article 206 and 207 of the “Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union” (TFEU). According to these Articles, FDI is an exclusive 
competence of the European Union. A recent report of the European Parliament from March 2011 
outlines its recommendations for the European Union’s future FDI policy. The four main principles 
of the recommended policy are the following (see European Parliament, p. 7–12):
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•  Long-lasting investments, since the main object of inward FDI is the creation of stable 
employment and stable economic growth.
•  Investor protection, which remains the first priority of investment agreements. This protection 
covers non-discrimination, a fair and equal treatment, and a protection against direct and 
indirect expropriation.
•  The ability for the European Union, at the same time, to protect itself against potentially 
aggressive foreign investment. The European Commission should decide on a case-by-
case basis which sectors need special protection and thus should not be covered by future 
agreements. These sectors could be strategically important for national defense and sensitive 
sectors such as culture, education, and public health.
•  Sustainable investment, which the European Parliament recommends that European Union’s 
future FDI policy promote. Sustainability refers to the environment and to good quality working 
conditions.
The main German law in this context is the Law on Foreign Trade and Payments 
(“Außenwirtschaftsgesetz”). Until 2009, Germany limited its controls of foreign investments to 
armaments manufacturers. A foreign investment in such a company required notice. It could be 
forbidden by the Federal Ministry of Economics in order to safeguard German security interests 
or foreign relations of Germany or the peaceful coexistence of the people of the world (see Thal 
and von Eyb 2011, p. 4). In April 2009, an amendment concerning the legal regulation of FDI 
in Germany took place. According to this amendment, FDI can only be forbidden if public order 
and safety are endangered and if the foreign investor gains a proportion of voting rights in the 
company of at least 25  % and if the foreign investor is based outside the European Union as well as 
Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Switzerland (see Thal and von Eyb 2011, p. 4). In this context, 
Germany – as does the U.S. – uses a broad national-security review mechanism and does not 
identify specific sectors for which reviews are required (see Marchick and Slaughter 2008, p. 37). 
Beyond these regulations, there are no further restrictions. Thus there are no special regulations 
for FDI from China or FDI executed by Sovereign Wealth Funds. In practice, most Sovereign Wealth 
Funds own less than 25  % of a company. Furthermore, Germany has no interest in discouraging any 
investor to carry out FDI in Germany. Thus, up to now, the German government has never used 
this law to forbid any Chinese investor from acquiring a German company (see Söhn 2010, p. 531).
In a supplementary way, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are an important tool of Germany’s 
FDI policy. In general, BITs are used in order to promote and attract foreign investments. In August 
2005, an “Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China 
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on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments” was signed. The intention of this 
BIT was the creation of favorable conditions for investment by investors from one contracting party 
in the territory of the other contracting party. The most important articles of this agreement are 
Article 2 (Promotion and Protection of Investment) and Article 3 (Treatment of Investment). These 
articles ascertain that each partner “shall encourage investors of the other Contracting Party to 
make investments in its territory and admit such investments in accordance with its laws and 
regulations,” that “investments of the investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy constant 
protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party” and that “neither Contracting 
Party shall take any arbitrary or discriminatory measures against the management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment and disposal of the investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party” 
(Article 2). Furthermore Germany and China agreed that “investments of investors of each 
Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of 
the other Contracting Party” and that “each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and 
activities associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party 
treatment not less favorable than that accorded to the investments and associated activities by its 
own investors” (Article 3, see Bundesgesetzblatt 2005, p. 734). Although the main intention of this 
BIT is the protection of German FDI in China – especially the guarantee of prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation in the case of expropriation – it also protects Chinese investors from unfair 
or discriminatory treatment in Germany (see European Commission 2010, p. 5).
The policy of mutual support of FDI and non-discrimination was affirmed at the Chinese-German 
intergovernmental consultations that took place at the end of June 2011 in Berlin. On the occasion 
of these consultations, Germany and China signed a declaration about mutual facilitation of 
investments. Both sides appreciated the growing interest of Chinese companies to invest in 
Germany in order to create jobs in Germany and in order to enter the German and the European 
market. In addition, both sides confirmed that they are considering installing a one-stop-shop 
in order to facilitate investments (see Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2011).
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On the Quantity and Outlook of Chinese FDI 
Although Chinese FDI has drawn increasing attention in the U.S. and Germany, China still holds 
less than 0.2 percent of the FDI stocks in both Germany and the U.S. This fact does not match up 
to the status of the three countries’ leading roles in the global economy. As China continues its 
economic development and its per-capita income grows, it will enter a new stage of foreign direct 
investment where its FDI in the U.S. and the EU will continue to experience strong growth. There 
will be profound implications to the trend, particularly given the current stage of global financial 
recovery. While the banking sector institutions continue to deleverage as a result of the financial 
crisis, unleashing investment potential from China can potentially play a much bigger role in 
bringing those countries that are facing a credit crunch back to growth. 
On the data
Lack of clear data from all three parties, China, Germany, and the U.S. merits comment. First of 
all, the difference in absolute numbers of Chinese FDI toward the U.S. is remarkably wide (See 
Figure 6). One explanation is that the U.S. only records the immediate source as the origination 
of FDI, so Chinese FDI toward the U.S. through another country is not counted by BEA. Also, full 
completion of quarterly and annual surveys is mandatory only for companies that have in excess 
of $20 million in assets, annual sales, or annual net income. Some other data calculations, such 
as the China Investment Monitor, are based on a bottom-up survey, which includes more of those 
investments that are not reported to BEA, so they are generally much larger. Nevertheless, the 
China Investment Monitor has been tracking FDI flows into the U.S. only since 2003, as is the case 
with the official Chinese data. In the case of Germany, the single most important official database 
for FDI is the statistics of the German Central Bank; therefore we concentrate on this database in 
our analysis. Unfortunately, these statistics neglect FDI projects of companies with a balance sheet 
total of less than 3 million Euros. Since small and medium companies play an essential role in 
Germany, it is useful to include FDI projects of companies with a balance sheet total of less than 
3 million Euros. Meanwhile, there are many different focuses when a certain organization collects 
FDI data, making it hard to compare industry attractiveness for Chinese investors. For example, 
the German Invest and Trade Agency compiles data based on Chinese greenfield FDI projects, 
because these are the ones that create jobs, and they rank attractive countries by project numbers 
instead of the amount. In this measurement scheme, Germany attracted more Chinese FDI than 
the U.S. in 2010. The lack of uniform data across and within countries makes it difficult to fully 
evaluate the magnitude or character of Chinese FDI in the U.S. and Germany. The importance of 
this issue will increase significantly in the future given the sharply upward trend in Chinese FDI 
in the industrialized world. 
42 Potential Challenges and Future Developments
Different Gestures in the U.S. and Germany toward Chinese Investment
There is some divergence between the U.S. and Germany toward Chinese FDI in some industries 
regarding national security concerns, such as telecommunications. Compared to the investment 
controls in the U.S., Germany seems to be less worried that FDI could have a negative impact 
on national security, because Germany’s FDI controls are less restrictive and no investment-
veto has yet occurred – unlike in the U.S. According to the OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index, 
Germany is more open to FDI than the U.S. and ranked 8th with respect to openness on the FDI 
Restrictiveness Index in 2010, which compares 48 countries based along four types of measures: 
foreign equity restrictions, screening and prior approval requirements, rules for key personnel, 
and other restrictions on the operation of foreign enterprises such as limits on the purchase of land 
or repatriation of profits and capital. The U.S. ranked 33rd (for more details see Kalinova, Palerm 
and Thomsen 2010).
As a result of the different regulatory environment for Foreign Direct Investment and different 
considerations of sensitive industries for national security purposes, some Chinese firms have had 
quite different experiences in their investment activities in the U.S. and in Germany, resulting in 
divergent perceptions. The U.S. has been widely perceived, fairly or unfairly, in China as lacking 
transparency towards Chinese FDI. The complaint has been brought up to the top-level leadership 
in China. In May 2011, the Chinese commerce minister openly questioned the credibility of the 
U.S. investment investigation process: “Even though those who were rejected were the minority, 
the possibility of being rejected by the U.S. has scared away Chinese companies that are taking the 
initial steps to invest abroad. We hope that American government and mediate institutions can tell 
us more clearly where we can invest and where we cannot.” (Caixin News 2011) This complaint 
seldom is heard about Germany. 
Particular	Uncertainty	for	U.S.-bound	Chinese	FDI
The lack of transparency surrounding the CFIUS process–particularly the lack of a clearly defined 
industry blacklist or a set of credibility criteria guiding review of investments—has created 
uncertainty among investors. This in turn may deter otherwise benign and mutually beneficial 
FDI from China. However, the emphasis on CFIUS and on the deterred deals by media is largely 
overblown and it taints the image that in general the U.S. wants to attract Chinese FDI. CFIUS has 
covered 313 transactions from 2008–2010, only 16 of which involved Chinese acquirers compared 
to 91 transactions of UK origin. That said, it is understandable that Chinese companies are under 
heavier scrutiny, given that Japan over the same period had roughly the same number of covered 
transactions, while the Netherlands and Finland combined had fewer than China (CFIUS 2011, 
18). These countries take a far more significant share in FDI in the U.S. than China (See Figure 9). 
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Even so, most of the Chinese transactions covered by CFIUS moved forward without any problem. 
Although CNOOC hit a wall in 2005 trying to acquire Unocal, its acquisition of offshore fields in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2009 was unopposed and the company successfully closed on a multi-billion 
dollar investment in Chesapeake Energy Corp in 2010. While Huawei was not able to acquire 
network gear maker 3Com, Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s personal computer division was cleared 
by CFIUS. In 2011, the Chinese Aviation Industry General Aircraft Co. also successfully acquired 
U.S. aircraft maker Cirrus after CFIUS review. 
The U.S. lacks a clear strategy toward Chinese FDI. There is some credibility in the complaint from 
China that it is not clear which industries are no-go in the U.S., and which are welcomed. At the 
same time, some apparently grounded suspicions of Chinese FDI projects in the U.S. are mainly 
politically driven. For example, 50 members of the Congressional Steel Caucus urged CFIUS to 
investigate the investment of the Chinese Anshan Iron and Steel Group in a 14 % share of the 
American Steel Development Company for a greenfield project (Visclosky 2011) Their arguments 
were based on loss of American jobs and on U.S. national security. However, this greenfield 
investment project is not covered by CFIUS jurisdiction, which only covers M&A projects, and 
is projected to create 1,000 construction jobs and 150 permanent plant jobs (Zhang 2010). 
This contrasts to the picture in Germany, where the most important objective associated with 
inbound FDI is the creation of jobs: any foreign investment which creates new jobs or safeguards 
employment in Germany is highly welcomed. 
Obstacles for Large Chinese SOEs
Similarly, while many large Chinese SOEs have the ability to manage cross-border M&A, many SOEs 
find state ownership to be a burden as they venture abroad because of the suspicion it elicits in 
host countries. When looking at the U.S. suspicion of the unfair advantages enjoyed by SOEs from 
China, it is very similar to its claim against large Japanese enterprises, which were believed to have 
received government backing 20 years ago. These concerns about Japanese companies’ potential 
destruction of the U.S. economy have proven to be overblown, because these very companies are 
now important building blocks of the U.S. economy, contributing to job creation and added value 
(see Figures 17–19). Since SOEs and other large companies are the major drivers of Chinese FDI, 
and many large companies in China have some linkage or history with the government, there is an 
important need to clarify or agree upon what constitutes SOEs, and the nature of Chinese SOEs. 
Also, as private companies from China grow, and more of them join in direct investment, there 
needs to be clarification of how they would be separated from SOEs facing investment regulations. 
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Large Chinese SOEs that invest in the U.S. and Germany also face enormous challenges even if 
cross-border M&As are successful. There may be problems in integration with local companies, 
resulting in operational difficulties and an ultimate failure of the M&A deal. According to a survey 
about Chinese FDI conducted by the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), 
Chinese FDI is facing a number of obstacles, including lack of fundraising ability, information 
asymmetry, international talent shortages, and insufficient policy support from the Chinese 
government. (See Table 3) These challenges highlight many of the indigenous future obstacles for 
China to further increase its FDI. 
Is Germany Overtaking the U.S. as the Top Investment Destination? 
The U.S. faces growing competition from other developed countries such as Germany to attract 
rapidly increasing FDI from China. It may be that a sense of inertia and complacency with 
the historical U.S. position as a top destination for FDI has blunted the urgency and slowed 
implementation of the reforms necessary to compete in a changing environment. One of the 
possible consequences of the different investment environment when handling Chinese FDI is 
that Germany can substitute for the U.S. as a more attractive destination for Chinese investors 
with its less restrictive FDI controls. This could be a particularly important consequence if Chinese 
FDI were to increase as predicted and the reliance of U.S. and Germany on Chinese investment 
increases to further encourage economic growth. At the moment, China invests more money in 
the U.S. than in Germany. Nevertheless, there are some arguments that suggest Germany could 
Table 3: The Main Obstacles to Chinese ODI
Obstacle Proportion of Enterprises 
Experiencing Issue
Lack of fund-raising ability 62.395 %
Information asymmetry 35.93 %
Shortage of international talent, including foreign language professionals 31.19 %
Insufficient policy support from the Chinese government 27.37 %
Lack of self initiative among business executives 25.54 %
Limited number of policies that support ODI 24.77 %
The culture gaps and different management philosophy during investment processes 24.01 %
High barriers to market entry within host countries 20.64 %
Excessive strictness of China’s foreign exchange management 15.44 %
Complex Chinese trade and investment regulations that slow the ODI process for Chinese 
businesses 
13.91 %
Lack of trust among host governments and enterprises of Chinese enterprises 11.93 %
Source: Survey by the Development Research Center of the State Council
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become more attractive for Chinese FDI. In terms of the number of FDI projects in Germany, China 
has recently taken the lead: In 2011 there were 827 FDI projects in Germany, 158 of which had 
Chinese investors, followed by 110 from the U.S. and 91 from Switzerland (see Germany Trade 
& Invest 2012). The main arguments for an increasing attractiveness are a greater openness in 
Germany than in the U.S. toward Chinese FDI, the equally high reputation of German goods and 
technologies as the U.S. ones, a more favorable general trend in terms of global competitiveness, a 
favorable trend in the development of labor costs per unit in Germany, and lower effective tax rates 
on capital income in Germany than in the U.S.
For more than 30 years, the World Economic Forum has published a Global Competitiveness Report 
in order to compare the productivity and competitiveness of different economies. Since 2005, the 
analysis has been based on a Global Competitiveness Index, which covers 12 metrics, ranging 
from institutions, infrastructure, and education to market efficiency, market size, technological 
readiness, and innovation. The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 contains the results 
for 142 countries. According to this report, the U.S. and Germany have almost the same level of 
competitiveness: On a scale from 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest competitiveness, the 
U.S. ranks 5th with an overall score of 5.43 and Germany ranks 6th with an overall score of 5.41. 
However it is quite remarkable that the U.S. has declined in rank for three years, whereas Germany 
continues an upward climb (See Figure 20). In 2001, Germany ranked 17th, in 2003 and 2004 13th, 
2006–2007 7th and now Germany is ranked 6th. The U.S. on the other hand was placed 1st or 2nd 
between 2001 and 2009. In the report 2010–2011, the U.S. was ranked 4th and in the current report 
5th5. If global competitiveness is an indicator of the attractiveness of a country as a location to 
invest and if the recent trends concerning the competitiveness of Germany and the U.S. continue, 
Germany should become a more attractive location for foreign investors.
Source: World Economic Forum 
Figure 20: Trends in Global Competitiveness Index Scores in the US and 
Germany 
2010 20112009
Germany
United States5.39 5.415.37
5.43 5.43
5.59
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Another trend favoring Germany is the development of labor costs per unit over the last fifteen 
years. While Germany is a high wage country, since the mid-nineties – and especially since the 
beginning of the new millennium – the growth of wages has been markedly lower than in other 
developed economies. The main reason for the low growth of labor costs per unit in Germany 
has been a shift toward greater wage restraint. This is first of all caused by a weakening of the 
bargaining power of the German unions. In 1990, more than 11 million people were members of 
unions. By 2011, that number had dropped to 6.15 million. Additional wage pressure was caused 
by high unemployment rates. From the mid-nineties to 2006, Germany’s unemployment rate 
ranged between 9.5 and 11.5 per cent. Only since 2007 has this rate been declining, reaching 7.7 
per cent in 2010 and 7.1 percent in 2011. Thus, from 1996 to 2008, labor costs per unit remained 
more or less constant. Illustrating labor costs per unit as an index (value of the year 2000 = 100), 
Germany’s labor costs per unit grew by just five percentage points from 1995 to 2010. In contrast, 
in the U.S. labor costs per unit increased by almost 30 percentage points over the same period (see 
Figure 21). As a result, in terms of labor costs, Germany is becoming comparatively more attractive 
for foreign investors.
Source: OECD, calculations of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
Figure 21: Labor Costs per Unit Across Countries and Times 
(index: Labor Costs per Unit in the Base Year 2000 = 100)
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6 The concept of effective tax rates refers to the combined effects of all elements of taxation such as statutory rates, tax deductions, 
and tax credits. Effective tax rates for different economic functions are calculated by dividing the total tax revenues of a certain 
category (for example capital) by a proxy for the tax base (for example capital income according to the national accounts, see for 
details European Commission 2011, p. 392)
Along similar lines, Germany offers tax advantages relative to the U.S. for potential investors. In 
2000, Germany had a corporate tax rate of more than 50 %. From 2001 to 2007, this tax rate was 
40 %, and in 2008 it fell to 30 %. In the U.S., corporate tax remained constant at a rate of 40 % (see 
Figure 22). Although a current proposal would lower corporate taxes by 7 %, this would still place 
the U.S. combined rate above that of Germany. This holds true as well when looking at effective 
tax rates6. The effective tax rate on capital income is significantly lower in Germany than in the 
U.S. In a study covering the years 1995 to 2007, Mathias Trabandt and Harald Uhlig calculated 
the effective tax rates for capital incomes in fifteen countries. In the U.S., these tax rates varied 
from 32.9 % to 38.3 % with an average rate of 36.4 %. In Germany, tax rates varied from 21.6 % to 
27 % with an average rate of 23.4 % (see Trabandt and Uhlig 2009 and Figure 9 in the appendix). 
Finally, the central position in the heart of Europe and its critical role in the European economy 
make Germany especially attractive for investors seeking a base to access opportunities in the 
larger EU market. 
Source: The Guardian Datablog 
Figure 22: Comparison of Corporate Tax in Main Industrialized FDI 
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First of all, empirical studies show that on the average, the fear that FDI reduces jobs is ill-founded. 
Quite the contrary: FDI creates jobs in almost all industrial countries. Officials and entrepreneurs 
in all three countries need to work to promote an accurate public image of the impact of Chinese 
foreign direct investment while U.S. and German leaders should send	 a	 strong	 welcoming	
signal	to Chinese investors. 
Second, it is important to provide better platforms of communication for Chinese investors to have 
a better grasp of the investment environment. There should be further coordination between U.S., 
German, and Chinese investment promotion bodies. To strengthen trust and encourage further 
Chinese FDI, a central task is to promote understanding of each country’s differing economic and 
social governance models, governance concepts, and ideologies. 
•  The	U.S.	 should	expand	 the	 federal	 role	 in	attracting	FDI	and	create	a	more	direct	
platform	for	interaction	with	investors. While many states have well-developed investment 
promotion programs, efforts to coordinate FDI promotion at the federal level have historically 
been lacking if not non-existent. The recent establishment and increased budget of SelectUSA 
is an encouraging first step. Greater funding is needed, as is better coordination with state 
initiatives and better linkage of investors to potential recipients of FDI. The government may 
also serve to facilitate closer peer-to-peer engagement between U.S. MNCs and their Chinese 
partners to help shepherd foreign investors through the procedures for setting up operations 
in the U.S.
•  The	 Chinese	 government	 should	 consider	 setting	 up	 an	 outward	 investment	
promotion	agency	with	local	branches	in	order	to	collaborate	with	its	U.S.	and	German	
counterparts	in	providing	support	to	its	investors. It can help Chinese investors to gain a 
better practical understanding of the different commercial, legal, and political environment in 
the U.S. and Germany. For example: Chinese investors should be more attuned to the important 
role Congress plays in investment policy formation. Many Chinese companies hoping to invest 
in the U.S. need a better understanding of the interplay between the legislative and executive 
branch in shaping FDI policies – particularly the autonomous position of the former relative 
to the latter. A more proactive strategy for dealing with Congress implies responsibility for 
Chinese companies to gain greater know-how in government relations by connecting with 
those in the U.S. who can best provide it. For the U.S., it implies providing investors with 
a better mechanism for understanding the legislative branch’s role. Also, Chinese investors 
should further familiarize themselves with the legal procedure and legal resources in the U.S. 
and Germany for conducting business. This is not only to help them play by the rules, but also 
to help them protect their businesses in the long term. 
49Recommendations for Moving Forward
• 	Chinese	government	and	companies	should	seek	to	further	clarify	the	management	
structure	of	SOEs	and	their	relationship	to	the	government. Since a lot of uneasiness 
surrounds large Chinese SOEs, which make up a significant share of Chinese FDI, this is 
particularly important to help build confidence and support in the U.S. and Germany for 
promoting Chinese investment. Meanwhile, China should put forth policies that encourage 
more outward investment by private Chinese companies, including SMEs (e.g. by providing 
policy information, relaxing capital control, etc). This could help expand the variety of 
investments and foster deeper cross-border investment linkages between China and its target 
markets. 
 
Third, to the extent possible, the U.S., Germany and China should seek to further clarify the rules 
for their investment markets. 
• 	There	should	be	better	coordination	among	the	three	countries	to	provide	comparable	
datasets	based	on	commonly	agreed	standards. This flows from a similar logic as general 
accounting standards; particularly as FDI from China grows, a lack of uniform agreement on 
what constitutes FDI and where it originates clouds the accuracy and efficacy of analysis and 
may lead to suboptimal or mistaken policy prescriptions.
• 	Germany	should	not	yield	to	public	pressure	to	impose	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	(SWF)	
controls. A special discussion applies to the role of SWF. In the public debate, various 
suggestions call for stronger controls of SWF investments. Germany should not accede to these 
requests, because such restrictions offend against the idea of an open investment regime, which 
is vital for Germany. On the other hand, Germany needs to cautiously deal with increasing calls 
for the EU to set up a similar institution to CIFUS. Being free from political influence of vested 
interests is vital but could be hard to achieve for such an entity, particularly in the EU.
• 	CFIUS	should	develop	and	make	public	both	a	list	of	strategic	industries	and	a	set	of	
objective	guidelines	for	determining	the	credibility	of	security	threats. Despite high-
profile cases, in reality the vast majority of acquisitions from China and elsewhere do not 
represent a credible security threat. CFIUS should therefore seek to expedite and standardize 
the process so that it does not deter would-be investors who do not pose a security threat to 
the U.S. The emphasis should be on industry analysis – and key variables such as industry 
concentration and barriers to entry – that can serve to protect security interests while 
insulating the process from political considerations based solely on the nationality of firms.
  Finally, the three countries should seek to utilize bilateral and multilateral channels of 
engagement to make improvements and upgrades to the investment climate.
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•  The	U.S.	should	seek	to	ease	regulatory	barriers	by	building	on	positive	initial	steps	
to	reform	visa	rules,	 tax	policies,	and	reporting	requirements. To reap the gains FDI 
confers – including more and better jobs – the U.S. should seek to attract investment with less 
restrictive regulations for foreign investors. The currently moribund negotiations over a new 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) could be resurrected as a springboard for such reform and 
greater certainty of the regulatory environment.
•  Investment	promotion	agencies	should	consider	hosting	a	 regularly	convened	U.S.-
EU-China	investment	fair	supported	by	the	respective	investment	promotion	agencies	
and	including	as	participants	potential	investors,	project	managers,	and	legal	experts,	
among	other	stakeholders. The experience in multilateral trade promotion has shown that 
similar multilateral efforts in investment could help establish an effective information platform 
and promote increases in investment volume. 
•  Moving	 forward,	 the	 U.S.,	 China,	 and	 the	 EU	 should	 consider	 starting	 a	 regular	
consultation	 process	 to	 further	 coordinate	 U.S.-China	 and	 EU-China	 bilateral	
investment	treaty	negotiations.	The three parties should consider a “China-U.S.-EU Foreign 
Direct Investment Treaty” which would be based on equal mutual benefits and seek to further 
consolidate the different sets of standards and rules in each country regarding foreign direct 
investment. 
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Table 1: Number of Foreign Companies in Germany (Absolute Number)
Year all countries US Japan China
1989 10664 1851 445 16
1990 11475 1913 485 20
1991 12271 1940 545 21
1992 12783 1984 597 22
1993 11741 1875 579 28
1994 11795 1850 575 31
1995 11866 1890 566 32
1996 11906 1909 563 32
1997 12093 1940 547 30
1998 12458 1994 540 28
1999 13343 2090 527 36
2000 13818 2059 520 35
2001 13979 2034 505 34
2002 9462 1429 388 19
2003 9300 1338 378 18
2004 9225 1278 366 18
2005 9605 1237 373 17
2006 10213 1226 374 25
2007 12629 1409 392 27
2008 13646 1459 416 33
2009 14234 1484 421 40
2010 14094 1428 421 44
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistik “Zeitreihen” (download: 30 April 2012). Note: FDI projects according to the German 
Central Bank (“Bundesbank”) do not include companies with a balance sheet total of less than three million Euros in which 
foreign investors hold more than 10 % of shares or voting rights.
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Table 2: Number of Employees of Foreign Companies in Germany  
(in Thousands)
Year all countries US Japan China
1989 1674 486 74 0
1990 1789 505 78 1
1991 1871 510 53 0
1992 1861 503 56 0
1993 1758 484 56 0
1994 1686 469 52 0
1995 1684 486 52 0
1996 1662 480 51 0
1997 1706 495 49 0
1998 1745 487 52 0
1999 1998 530 50 0
2000 2130 506 51 0
2001 2165 501 50 0
2002 2143 475 48 0
2003 2162 450 47 0
2004 2280 518 43 0
2005 2196 388 45 0
2006 2331 349 43 1
2007 2560 332 42 1
2008 2664 346 49 3
2009 2587 314 50 3
2010 2565 296 49 3
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistik “Zeitreihen” (download: 30 April 2012). Note: FDI projects according to the German 
Central Bank (“Bundesbank”) do not include companies with a balance sheet total of less than three million Euros and in 
which foreign investors hold more than 10 % of shares or voting rights.
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Table 3: Volume of Sales of Foreign Companies in Germany  
(Billions of Euros)
Year all contries US Japan China
1989 732.7 219.3 49.5 0.6
1990 806.2 237.2 55.3 0.3
1991 886.4 254.7 52.8 0.5
1992 903.0 263.6 57.6 0.7
1993 879.0 256.1 53.6 0.9
1994 919.2 269.4 52.3 0.6
1995 965.0 285.6 57.8 1.0
1996 993.4 292.9 60.5 0.7
1997 1086.0 314.7 61.3 0.7
1998 1142.9 296.9 68.5 0.8
1999 666.1 150.8 32.7 0.3
2000 762.9 146.4 36.8 0.5
2001 795.1 159.0 39.8 0.5
2002 808.2 147.0 36.3 0.4
2003 845.5 133.7 36.7 0.6
2004 953.3 187.6 36.0 0.6
2005 1030.1 142.6 38.8 0.7
2006 1134.1 132.0 40.1 0.9
2007 1261.0 132.6 40.4 1.3
2008 1346.0 143.2 45.8 1.5
2009 1180.4 117.2 42.7 1.2
2010 1263.0 139.1 40.2 1.5
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistik “Zeitreihen” (download: 30 April 2012). Note: FDI projects according to the German 
Central Bank (“Bundesbank”) do not include companies with a balance sheet total of less than three million Euros and in 
which foreign investors hold more than 10 % of shares or voting rights.
Table 4: Ten Important Chinese Projects by Jobs Created in Germany Since 2003
Company Name Destination State Jobs 
created
Sector
Goldwind Science and Technology Co Ltd Saarland 100 Engines & Turbines
Evoc Intelligent Technology North Rhine-Westphalia 80 Business Machines & Equipment
Cosco Hamburg 80 Transportation
Huapeng Brandenburg 46 Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools
Hangzhou Donghua Chain Group North Rhine-Westphalia 40 Metals
ZTE North Rhine-Westphalia 30 Communication
Sany North Rhine-Westphalia 30 Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools
ZhongQiang Electric Tools Bavaria 20 Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools
Xi An Typical Industries Rheinland-Pfalz 17 Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools
Zoje Rheinland-Pfalz 15 Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools
Source: Germany Trade & Invest, Germany’s Major Investment Partners – China, Berlin/Bonn 2011, p. 17.
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Table 6: Extra-EU FDI Stocks (EU inward FDI) by Economic Activities  
(Billions of Euros), End-2008
Agriculture, hunting and fishing   1.4
Mining and quarrying   40.0
Manufacturing   330.3
          Food products    53.3
           Textiles and wood activities    33.2
           Petroleum, chemical, rubber, plastic products    124.5
          Metal and mechanical products    46.1
          Machinery, computers, RTV, communication    14.1
          Vehicles and other transport equipment    22.9
Electricity, gas and water   18.2
Construction   13.4
Services   2088.4
          Trade and repairs    139.0
          Hotels and restaurants    13.4
           Transport and communications    41.8
          Financial Intermediation    1356.9
          Real estate and business services    514.3
          Other services    23.0
Other sectors   30.7
Total 2522.3
Source: Eurostat: Foreign direct investment flows still influenced by the crisis, Statistics in focus 25/2011, p. 6.
Table 5: The Most Important FDI Partners of the European Union in 2010: 
EU Direct Investment Inward Stocks by Extra EU Investing Countries 
(Billions of Euros)
Extra EU-27 (total)   2964.150
U.S.   1201.378
Switzerland   365.425
Canada   143.069
Japan   129.056
Singapore   67.346
Brazil   67.322
Norway   64.508
Hong Kong   42.228
Russia   41.994
Australia   29.627
Source: Eurostat, Data on “Balance of payment statistics“, (download: 15 March 2012).
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Table 7: FDI Intensity (= Average Value of Inward and Outward FDI Flows 
of a Country Divided by the GDP of this Country) of Selected Countries in 
2009 and 2010 (Percent of GDP)
                   2009                     2010
EU-27  2.3  1.0
Spain  0.6  1.7
Greece  0.7  0.2
Portugal  0.8  –1.5
Italy  1.0  1.0
Germany  1.8  2.3
United Kingdom  2.7  1.9
France  2.6  2.3
Switzerland  5.7  8.1
Ireland  11.8  10.7
Luxembourg  417.4  365.8
U.S.  1.6  1.9
Japan  0.9  0.5
Source: Eurostat, Data on “Balance of payment statistics“, (download: 3 May 2012).
Table 8: Share of China’s and Hong Kong’s FDI in the EU-27
Share of China’s FDIs Share of Hong Kong’s FDI Share of China’s plus Hong Kong’s FDI
1998 0.057  % 0.274  % 0.331  %
1999 0.058  % 0.418  % 0.477  %
2000 0.047  % 0.973  % 1.020  %
2001 0.049  % 0.865  % 0.914  %
2002 0.041  % 0.930  % 0.971  %
2003 0.033  % 0.521  % 0.554  %
2004 0.108  % 0.799  % 0.907  %
2005 0.066  % 0.916  % 0.982  %
2006 0.177  % 0.862  % 1.039  %
2007 0.193  % 0.696  % 0.889  %
2008 0.224  % 1.045  % 1.269  %
2009 0.211  % 1.037  % 1.249  %
2010 0.227  % 1.425  % 1.652  %
Source: Eurostat, Data on “Balance of payment statistics“, (download: 15 March 2012), own calculations.
56 Statistical Appendix
Table 9: Effective Tax Rates for Capital Income  
(Capital Income Taxes in Percent Across Countries and Time)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
USA 37.8 37.3 37.1 37.5 37.3 38.3 36.1 32.9 33.6 34.0 36.4 36.4 38.2
EU-14 29.6 30.9 32.6 33.3 35.2 34.7 33.7 31.7 30.6 31.0 32.7 34.8 34.4
GER 23.1 22.8 22.8 23.9 25.9 27.0 21.6 21.4 22.0 21.6 22.3 24.4 24.8
FRA 27.9 30.3 32.2 34.9 37.5 36.9 38.0 36.0 34.6 36.6 37.1 40.1 39.2
ITA 32.7 34.0 36.2 32.3 35.1 32.2 33.7 32.9 31.7 31.8 32.8 37.4 39.1
GBR 40.3 39.9 42.8 45.9 47.4 52.1 52.5 45.8 42.4 42.5 46.9 49.2 45.1
AUT 20.4 23.5 25.6 25.6 24.0 23.6 28.7 24.4 24.0 23.6 22.9 22.3 23.2
BEL 38.1 40.4 41.9 44.9 44.9 44.3 46.6 45.3 42.8 41.4 40.8 40.5 39.6
DNK 43.3 44.6 44.9 52.5 47.8 46.2 49.5 50.7 51.5 52.3 57.3 58.3 59.3
FIN 28.2 32.0 32.4 33.3 33.3 39.2 31.4 31.1 29.3 29.5 30.1 28.4 29.3
GRE NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 20.1 17.1 16.7 15.0 14.8 15.5 14.5 14.5
IRL NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 17.5 19.0 20.3 21.0 24.2 22.5
NET 27.6 30.4 30.3 30.9 31.4 30.3 31.3 29.5 26.9 27.4 30.8 28.2 26.1
PRT 18.9 20.6 21.2 21.0 23.4 26.1 24.4 25.2 23.4 23.2 24.0 25.6 27.6
ESP NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 25.9 24.8 26.6 27.1 29.1 32.6 35.0 36.2
SWE 30.1 36.2 39.0 39.8 41.5 49.8 47.2 40.4 40.3 40.7 44.0 40.8 41.8
Source: Trabandt and Uhlig 2011. Supplementary Documentation. p. 19.
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7 In BEA data, Chinese FDI through UBO is more than twice as high as FDI through Foreign Parent. We are in the process of 
researching why this might be – and to what extent the use of holding companies in tax havens may contribute to the wide disparity 
we see in the data.
Methodological Appendix
Data on FDI are hardly to be compared, because there are no commonly agreed accounting 
standards. Thus there are vast differences in FDI statistics. In this report, we used the following 
FDI data:
U.S.
For the American Data on FDI we used two main sources: The Statistics of the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) at the Department of Commerce and Statistics of Rhodium Group’s 
China Investment Monitor.
•  Statistics	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Bureau	 of	 Economic	 Analysis	 (BEA)	 at	 the	 Department	 of	
Commerce:	The Bureau of Economic Analysis collects data based on mandatory surveys of 
foreign affiliates that are then aggregated and published by country and industry. However, 
full completion of quarterly and annual surveys is mandatory only for companies that have in 
excess of $20 million in assets, annual sales, or annual net income and that have more than a 
10 % foreign ownership share. The BEA also distinguishes between Ultimate Benefical Owner 
(UBO) and Foreign Parent FDI – the latter recording only direct capital links to a foreign 
investor and the former accounting for indirect capital links that might be channeled through 
a holding company. Both sets of data are published.7 In addition to foreign investment position 
data, the BEA also compiles a number of useful financial and operating data, including R&D 
spending, value-added, employment and wages. However, for much of this data, there is a 
greater than two-year lag in availability.
•  Statistics	of	Rhodium	Group’s	China	Investment	Monitor: This is a relatively new dataset 
that tracks acquisitions and greenfield investment by Chinese firms based on information 
in commercial databases, news reports, and on-the-ground information from Rhodium 
Group contacts in China. The main advantage of this dataset is the comprehensive real-time 
information it provides on Chinese investments. However, data are only available since 2003, 
and since it only includes information about Chinese FDI into the United States, the dataset is 
not directly comparable with those involving other countries.
China
FDI statistics compiled by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China encompass 
those investments in which domestic investors hold a  10 % or greater equity share of a foreign 
enterprise in terms of cash, fixed assets or intangible assets. Data are culled from reports by local 
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departments that are then aggregated at the Ministry of Commerce, and the basic approach is 
to ensure that qualifying enterprises fill out the statistical statements regularly. The SAFE (State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange) is in charge of the financial sector statistics of Foreign Direct 
Investment. The typical survey is also frequently used by the Ministry of Commerce, National 
Bureau of Statistics and SAFE to collect and collate the relevant information.
Germany
The main source for FDI data in Germany is the German Central Bank (»Bundesbank«). In addition, 
we also refer to the FDI database of fDi Markets:
•  Statistics	of	the	German	Central	Bank	(»Bundesbank«):	The German Central Bank has 
on the one hand a broad understanding of FDI. FDI stocks include new investments by foreign 
investors, foreign mergers and acquisitions, and foreign credits or loans. On the other hand, 
FDI Statistics of German Central Bank include only companies whose balance sheets total 
at least 3 million Euros and cases in which foreign investors hold more than 10 % of shares 
or voting rights. Furthermore, the German Central Bank distinguishes between primary 
(“unmittelbare”) and secondary (“mittelbare”) FDI. Primary FDI consists of direct capital links 
between a foreign investor and a company in Germany: the investor holds the shares himself 
or lends the capital himself. Secondary FDI consists of indirect capital links between a foreign 
investor and a company in Germany: the shares are held via a dependent holding company. 
The German Central Bank consolidates primary and secondary FDI (see also Germany Trade & 
Invest 2011, p. 5). According to a special edict (“Außenwirtschaftsverordnung”) every domestic 
company with a balance sheet total of 3 million Euros and more is obliged by law to report 
each year to the German Central Bank, if any foreign investor owns 10 % or more of its shares 
or voting rights (see Deutsche Bundesbank 2012, p. 65–66).
•	 	FDI	 database	 of	 fDi	Markets	 (a	 commercial	 database): fDi Markets collects FDI data 
from investment announcements by different sources (official sources, investor information, 
press releases) for the entire world. FDI projects according to fDi Markets include greenfield 
investment projects (new operations) and brownfield investment projects (expansion and 
re-investment). Since this FDI definition does not include foreign mergers and acquisitions, 
and foreign credits or loans, this FDI definition is smaller than definition of the German Central 
Bank. Otherwise fDi Markets has no restriction in terms of balance sheet totals or minimum 
shareholder shares or voting rights. Thus this FDI definition is larger than the definition of the 
German Central Bank with respect to this aspect.
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